Note the Human Medicines (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019 No. 775) [Link] which will come into force on “exit day” (in the event that the UK withdraws from the EU). The Regulations heavily amend the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 (and also amends the Medicines (Products for Human Use) (Fees) Regulations 2016.
R v Coker  EWCA Crim 420 [Link]
In R v Coker, the Court of Appeal held that, applying Hughes (1985) 81 Cr App R p.348, Martin  1 WLR 588, and Abi-Khalil,  EWCA Crim 17, the elements of the offence under s.4(3)(b) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, of which the prosecution must make the jury sure, are:
(1) that there has been the supply of a controlled drug to another in contravention of s.4(1);
(2) that the defendant in question participated in an enterprise involving such supply;
(3) that the defendant knew the nature of the enterprise, namely that it involved such supply.
Subject to such tailoring as is required for the individual facts, those elements of the offence were to be included in directions given to the jury when considering a charge under s.4(3)(b).
There was no room for an either/or direction. When the issue went to whether or not a defendant was concerned with supply or an offer to supply controlled drugs, the count in question had either relate to subsection (b) or to subsection (c).
COMMENT: This is an important decision but, for understandable reasons, the Court heard no argument (and expressed no view) on the construction of s.4(3)(a) of the MDA or concerning the situation where the indictment contained separate counts, one under s.4(3)(b) and another under s.4(3)(c).
R v Fulton  EWCA Crim 163 [Link]
The CACD held that the decision in R v Sivaraman  EWCA Crim 1736 was not authority for the proposition that an employee who is involved in a conspiracy with his employer does not individually gain a benefit. The difference between the position of an employee acting honestly in the course of his legitimate employment and that of the appellant acting as a money launderer was fundamental.
The appellant had submitted that although R v Waya  1 AC 294 only expressly imposed the requirement of proportionality upon an order for payment of the “recoverable amount” (likewise the subsequent amendment to s.6(5) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002), the same requirement ought also to apply to the level of “benefit” found by the court. However, the Court did not hear full argument on this point at the hearing (although it saw force in the submissions). In any event, it was unnecessary to reach a concluded view on the point. The situations of disproportionality cited and discussed in Waya comprised two cases where defendants had fully restored to the loser any proceeds of crime (R v Morgan  EWCA Crim 1323 and R v Bygrave  1 Cr App R (S) 60) EWCA Crim 1323), and one case where the defendant had obtained small over-payments on otherwise legitimate pharmaceutical orders.
R v Garry  EWHC 636 (Admin)
It was said in Garry that whether the defence of reasonable excuse is made out depends on the facts of the case in which regard the fact-finding tribunal enjoys a wide discretion. An innocent purpose for having an offensive weapon in a public place does not equate to a reasonable excuse. The fact-finding tribunal is entitled to consider necessity or immediate temporal connection between possession of the weapon and the purpose for which it was carried (at ). Proof that the weapon was for use at work is not dispositive of reasonable excuse. In many instances, when a defendant proves use of the item for work, reasonableness of that use would not arise. That said, conclusive proof of a habit of using the weapon for work might prompt review of whether that use was reasonable (at ). One question for fact-finders is whether the defendant’s assertion that the weapon was used for work is credible.