Legislation

For the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, see [Link], which was signed by the UK Government on 5 September 2024 [Link] and see the Explanatory Report to that instrument [Link].  See also the Public Authority Algorithmic and Automated Decision-Making Systems Bill [HL] (a Private Members’ Bill) as introduced in the House of Lords on the 9th September 2024 [Link].

For the Pet Abduction Act 2024 (in force from 24 August 2024), see [Link].

For the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Requisite and Minimum Custodial Periods) Order 2024 (SI 2024 No.844), see [Link] noting the two commencement dates (10th September 2024, and 22nd October 2024).  Not the “excluded offences” in the Schedule.  Part of the Explanatory Note reads “Article 3(1), (2) and (3) of the Order modifies the application of sections 243A, 244(3)(a) and 264(6)(d) of the 2003 Act so that applicable prisoners are released from a sentence of imprisonment when they have served 40 per cent of an applicable  sentence as opposed to the current 50 per cen”.

For the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment, Surrender and Compensation) Order 2024 (SI 2024 No.583), see [Link].  The Explanatory Note to the SI reads (in part): “The Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 (S.I. 1988/2019)….specifies descriptions of weapons to which section 141 applies and sets out defences to the section 141 offences.  Part 2 of this Order adds a new weapon description at paragraph 1(sa) in the Schedule to the 1988 Order (the weapon sometimes known as a “zombie-style knife” or “zombie-style machete”), provides for defences to the section 141 offences in relation to this new weapon description, and provides for a bluntness defence which applies to both paragraph 1(sa) and paragraph 1(r) weapons (curved swords).   Parts 3 and 4 of this Order provide for a scheme under which compensation can be claimed by persons surrendering weapons which fall under the new paragraph 1(sa).”

For the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, see [Link].

For the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Search, Recovery of Cryptoassets and Investigations: Codes of Practice) Regulations 2024 (SI 2024/551), see [Link].

For the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Investigative Powers of Prosecutors: Code of Practice) Order 2024 (SI 2024/542), see [Link].

For the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and Terrorism Act 2000 (Certain Information Orders: Code of Practice) Regulations 2024 (SI 2024/552), see [Link].

For the Misuse of Drugs and Misuse of Drugs (Designation) (England and Wales and Scotland) (Amendment and Revocation) Regulations 2024 (SI 2024 No.248) see [Link], which revokes with immediate effect SI 2024 No.239 [Link].

For the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) Order 2024 (SI 2024 No.190); in force 20th March 2024: see [Link].  The Explanatory Note states “Article 2(2) of this Order brings fifteen synthetic opioids, including fourteen nitazenes, under control as Class A drugs under the Act. Article 2(3) of this Order brings cumyl-PeGaClone, diphenidine, ephenidine, and methoxyphenidine under control as Class B drugs under the Act.  Article 2(4) of this Order brings remimazolam under control as a Class C drug under the Act”.

For the Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2024 (SI 2024 No.63); in force on 19th January 2024: see [Link]

For the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2024 (SI 2024 No 62) in force on 1st April 2024: see [Link]

Cases

R v BOB & Ors [2024] EWCA Crim 1494 [Link]

In R v BOB and others, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) suggested that the Riat 6 steps may be reformulated, resulting in 7 steps, so that there there is “a new step 1 dealing with disclosure and an expanded steps 3 and 7, formerly (ii) and (vi). In most cases
the review of disclosure should not be a burden on the court. The obligation is on the prosecution to inform the court that it has done its job properly and to produce the results of the investigation. It is to be hoped that that will be enough in most cases. In including the disclosure obligation as one of the steps we are adding it to a checklist, but not in any way changing what Riat already requires:-

“The statutory framework provided for hearsay evidence by the CJA 2003 can usefully be considered in these successive steps:
1. is the court satisfied that the prosecution has adduced all relevant evidence, and disclosed all relevant unused material to enable the court to assess the extent to which the hearsay evidence is demonstrably reliable and, if not, the extent to which it can be safely assessed and tested? If not, should the court simply refuse the application or do the interests of justice require directions for a proper disclosure process?
2. is there a specific statutory justification (or “gateway”) permitting the admission of hearsay evidence (ss.116–118)?
3. what material is there which can help to test or assess the hearsay? This may be undermining evidence admitted under s.124, or other inconsistent evidence and it may also be independent dovetailing or supporting evidence. The court is required to make a judgment on the basis of all the evidence, having regard to the issues in the case and the importance of the hearsay to those issues.
4. is there a specific “interests of justice” test at the admissibility stage?
5. if there is no other justification or gateway, should the evidence nevertheless be considered for admission on the grounds that admission is, despite the difficulties, in the interests of justice (s.114(1)(d))?
6. even if admissible, ought the evidence to be ruled inadmissible (s.78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and/or s.126 of the CJA 2003)?
7. if the evidence is admitted, then should the case subsequently be stopped under s.125? This safeguard should be considered in all cases where it applies, at the initiative of the court if the parties do not raise it. It will generally be best determined at the conclusion of all the evidence. This is reinforced by the fact that this is the stage when the judge is likely to have drafted legal directions and to be consulting counsel about them. In a case of this kind, where the prosecution seeks to prove an important and disputed fact by relying on hearsay, the judge is required to give a careful and tailored direction to assist the jury in deciding whether they can safely rely on the hearsay or not. Its sufficiency will be relevant to the safety of any resulting conviction and it will be helpful for the judge to have regard to it when carrying out the assessment required by section 125.

R v Thompson [2024] EWCA 470 (Admin) [Link]

It was held in Thompson v CPS [2024] EWHC 470 (Admin) [LINK], that the definition in para.(s) requires “an objective consideration of what the images or words in question ‘suggest’. The subjective intention of the person in possession is irrelevant. Thus, it matters not if the person in private possession of the knife is merely a ‘collector’ who seeks to display the knife in a cabinet or by some other means and who has no intention of ever using it to commit or threaten violence. If the images or words on the knife in private possession suggest that it is to be used for violence, then the offence is committed” (at [19]). The Court, and the parties, accepted that the word “suggest” means “to bring to one’s mind by association of ideas” (at [21]): ” If the words or images on a knife can by the association of ideas bring to mind that the item is to be used for violence, then the statutory definition would be met.” (per Choudhury J., at [21]).

Materials

For an interesting and useful House of Commons Paper on the UK prison population, see Georgina Sturge, “UK Prison Population Statistics“, 8 July 2024, House of Commons Library, Number 04334 [LINK]